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Abstract
South Korea’s experience is unparalleled in its combination of sustained prosperity, capital controls, and ﬁ nancial crisis. Over sev-
eral decades South Korea experienced rapid sustained growth in the presence of capital controls. Th ese controls and the delinking 
of domestic and international ﬁ nancial markets were an essential component of the country’s state-led development strategy. As 
the country developed, opportunities for easy technological catch-up eroded, requiring more sophisticated corporate and ﬁ nancial 
sector decision making. But decades of ﬁ nancial repression had bequeathed a bureaucratized ﬁ nancial system and a formidable 
constellation of incumbent stakeholders opposed to transition to a more market-oriented development model. Liberalization 
undertaken in the 1990s was less a product of textbook economic analysis than of parochial politicking. Th e capital account liber-
alization program aﬀ ected the timing, magnitude, and particulars of the 1997–98 crisis. Despite considerable reforms undertaken 
since the crisis, concerns remain about both South Korea’s lending culture and its authorities’ capacity to successfully regulate the 
more complex ﬁ nancial system. Th e main lesson of the South Korean case appears to be that while the state-led model may deliver 
impressive initial gains, transitioning out of this approach presents an exceedingly complex political-economy challenge.
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 South Korean economic performance over the last four decades has been nothing short of spectacular. 
During this period the country experienced only two years of negative growth: 1980, in the wake of the 
second oil shock and the assassination of President Park Chung-hee, and 1998, in the midst of the Asian 
financial crisis (figure 1). Between the initiation of a wide-ranging economic reform program by Park in 
1963 and the financial crisis in 1997, real per capita income growth as measured in purchasing power–
adjusted terms averaged more than 6 percent annually, and per capita income stood at more than eight 
times its level when reforms began. According to the Penn World Tables, at the start of that period the 
country’s income level was lower than that of Bolivia and Mozambique; by the end it was higher than that 
of Greece and Portugal.1
Most economists would probably subscribe to the rough notion that more complete markets are 
preferable to less complete markets. In the case of financial markets, a large theoretical and empirical 
literature supports the notion that the development of local financial markets and their integration into 
international markets encourages a variety of desirable outcomes. Yet during its period of rapid growth, 
South Korea deliberately eschewed the purported gains of international financial integration and instead 
maintained extensive controls on international capital flows as part of a more general policy of financial 
repression undertaken in the context of a state-led development strategy. In other words, rapid sustained 
growth occurred in the presence of capital controls for a period of several decades. This is not to argue 
that capital controls were causal: This paper will not speculate on the counterfactual of what South 
Korean economic performance might have been under a different policy package but will simply 
acknowledge that this period of rapid growth coincided with the existence of capital controls, and that 
these controls and the delinking of domestic and international financial markets was an essential 
component of the country’s state-led development strategy. 
Problems arose as the country approached the international technological frontier and 
opportunities for easy technological catch-up began to erode. The disappearance of straightforward paths 
for industrial upgrading based on imitating the prior trajectories of more advanced economies put a 
heightened premium on the ability of corporate managements and their financiers to discern emerging 
profit opportunities. The old development strategy was no longer adequate, but decades of state-led 
growth had bureaucratized the financial system and created a formidable constellation of incumbent 
stakeholders opposed to liberalization and to a transition toward a more market-oriented development 
model. As rents dissipated, both financial and nonfinancial firms scrambled to claim the dwindling low-
hanging fruit. 
                                                 
1 South Korea was “deceptively poor” in the 1950s, in that per capita income was unusually low relative to human 
capital (Noland and Pack 2002, table 2.1), a situation presumably explained in large part by the destruction of much 
of its physical capital stock during the Korean War (1950–53). That said, South Korea also accumulated human 
capital extremely rapidly relative to other large developing countries of that era (Noland and Pack 2002, figure 2.3). 
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 Under these conditions, the liberalization undertaken in the early 1990s was less a product of 
textbook economic analysis than of parochial politicking. A combination of South Korean policy, its 
accession to the OECD, and the Basle accords on capital adequacy created unintended incentives for 
short-term bank borrowing. The highly leveraged nature of the South Korean economy, together with the 
currency and term mismatches embodied in the mid-1990s surge of foreign debt exposure, left the 
economy vulnerable to a variety of negative shocks, and in 1997, in the context of the broader Asian 
upheaval, South Korea experienced a financial crisis with net cleanup costs that eventually amounted to 16 
percent of 2001 GDP.2 The South Korean case is interesting precisely because it combines in an 
unparalleled manner the characteristics of sustained success, capital controls, and financial crisis. 
To preview the conclusions of this paper, capital controls were a necessary component of the 
state-led development process. The problem is that it is difficult to transition out of the state-led model—
interventions create their own constituencies, and the 1990s liberalization was a function of political 
competition among domestic financial and corporate institutions over declining rents and foreign financial 
service providers seeking to enter the South Korean market. 
Two concerns were expressed contemporaneously in South Korea about capital account 
liberalization: that it would adversely affect incumbent South Korean financial services firms and that it 
could be macroeconomically destabilizing. Systemic risk was sufficiently high that South Korea might well 
have experienced a financial crisis regardless of capital account liberalization; the liberalization program 
affected the timing, magnitude, and particulars of the crisis.  
The degree of financial market integration between South Korea and the rest of the world is 
considerably higher as a result of the crisis-driven removal of capital controls. Yet the “dumbing down” of 
the financial system produced by decades of financial repression may have left lingering effects. South 
Korea seems to have emerged from the crisis relatively successfully. But concerns remain, largely centering 
on the apparent difficulty of changing the lending culture of until recently bureaucratized financial 
institutions and the counterpart challenge of improving the quality of market-oriented financial oversight 
by regulators more experienced in systems of greater direct command and control. In the specific 
historical and political circumstances of South Korea, it is an open question whether use of capital 
controls could have been separated from the more general policy of financial repression and more 
dynamic domestic financial markets fostered in their presence.  
 
                                                 
2 In these regards, the South Korean case is similar to those of Japan and Taiwan, which also combined state-led 
growth and capital controls and in the 1990s experienced financial crises costing double-digit shares of GDP.  
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 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
South Korea inherited a legacy of financial repression from Japanese colonial occupation (1910–45) that 
carried into the period of independence (1948), reflecting the dirigiste character of Japanese colonial 
administration and the continuation of extensive controls by the US military authorities in the immediate 
postwar period. A continuing theme throughout South Korean economic history has been the critical role 
of the state, its role in the generation of rents, and the politicization of their distribution, starting with the 
first postcolonial president of South Korea, Rhee Syng-man, who exploited the policy-generated rents to 
build political power.3 According to Cho (1994), South Korean economic policy was aimed at maximizing 
the value of American aid in the aftermath of the Korean War (1950–53), which had left the country 
devastated, and during the ensuing Cold War standoff. Aid financed most of capital accumulation and, at 
its peak in the late 1950s, 85 percent of imports (figure 2). 
A military government led by General Park Chung-hee took control in 1961. As shown in figure 
3, when Park seized power, gross domestic saving net of aid was derisory. Gross investment, financed 
mostly by aid, stood at a bit more than 10 percent of GDP, and the current account was in rough balance. 
After two years of poor economic performance, the military government unified the existing multiple 
exchange rate system, devalued the currency, and initiated a series of wide-ranging reforms. After a brief 
experiment with floating, the currency was pegged to the US dollar and would remain so until 1980 (Koo 
and Park 1990). Domestic saving net of aid began rising rapidly (looking at figure 3 one can understand 
why development economists adopted Rostow’s take-off metaphor). Domestic investment began rising 
even faster.  
While in some ways Park’s reform package marked a fundamental departure from past practices 
(with respect to trade policy, for example), it retained an important role for the state in the development 
process. Pervasive regulatory entry barriers (and thus protection from competition for incumbents), and 
Park’s penchant for sole-sourcing important infrastructural and other large-scale government-supported 
projects in effect socialized risk and created opportunities for cross-subsidization across different business 
ventures, encouraging the chaebol (family-dominated conglomerates) to diversify into otherwise unrelated 
lines of business. By the 1980s, the top 10 chaebol accounted for more than 20 percent of national income 
(SaKong 1993, table A.20). Bank of Korea independence was ended and the bank made subservient to the 
Ministry of Finance and ultimately the Blue House. 
The accumulation of capital contributed to rapid technological upgrading and a stunning 
transformation of the composition of output. In 1963 nonfuel primary products accounted for more than 
                                                 
3 See Cargill (1999) for a comparison of the Japanese and South Korean financial systems. See Jones and SaKong 
(1980) and Woo (1991) for examples of the use of state-derived rents for political power building. 
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 half of South Korea’s exports, and human hair wigs were the third leading item. A decade later South 
Korea’s exports were dominated by manufactures such as textiles, electrical products, and iron and steel; 
only one primary product category, fish, made the top 10. As seen in figure 3, capital accumulation was 
financed primarily by growing domestic saving, augmented by a significant inflow of saving from abroad, 
nearly reaching 10 percent of GDP in 1971 and actually breaching this threshold in 1974 after the first oil 
shock.  
These inflows predominately took the form of long-term loans and trade credits from private 
lenders and public institutions (including the multilateral development banks) all subject to Bank of Korea 
regulation (figure 4). Portfolio inflows and inward foreign direct investments were negligible during this 
period. A substantial academic literature (e.g., Westphal, Rhee, and Purcell 1981, Westphal, Kim, and 
Dahlman 1985) attempts to understand the sources of South Korean industrial competence and 
documents the varied forms of technological transfer and interaction between South Korean and foreign 
firms. Figure 4 indicates that, whatever the origins of South Korean technical mastery, much of the 
foreign capital arrived in the form of technologically disembodied loans.   
In 1972 Park, who had been reelected for a third term, pushed through the Yushin (Revitalization) 
Constitution, which in essence made him president-for-life. For a variety of reasons, he initiated the 
intensive promotion of heavy industry through what came to be known as the Heavy and Chemical 
Industry (HCI) policy. Modest financial sector liberalizations that had been undertaken in the late 1960s 
were reversed in 1972, when interest rates were lowered and direct government control of the banking 
system was increased in order to channel capital to preferred sectors, projects, or firms (figure 5). In order 
to finance large-scale projects, special public financial institutions were established, and private 
commercial banks were instructed to make loans to strategic projects on a preferential basis. By the late 
1970s, the share of these “policy loans” had risen to 60 percent (Yoo 1994). These loans carried, on 
average, negative real interest rates, and the annual interest subsidy grew from about 3 percent of GNP in 
1962–71 to approximately 10 percent of GNP on average between 1972 and 1979 (Pyo 1989).4 With such 
a large share of national income at stake, the allocation of these highly subsidized loans became the focus 
of intense political activity.  
Park was assassinated in 1979 during what amounted to a palace coup. General Chun Doo-hwan 
and his fellow officers more or less stumbled into power, driven more by intramilitary rivalries and narrow 
career interests than by any real sense of where they wanted to take the country (Clifford 1997). Facing 
deteriorating economic performance exacerbated by the second oil shock, Chun and his cronies turned to 
Western-trained economic technocrats, who were already attempting to introduce a stabilization policy 
                                                 
4 The definition of “policy loans” is imprecise, and various sources report significantly different figures. See Cho (1994) 
for discussion, and see SaKong (1993, tables A.18 and A.19) and Krueger and Yoo (2002) for alternative calculations.  
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 and reverse the worst excesses of the HCI policy, to fix the economy and shore up the generals’ political 
legitimacy.5  
Despite at times carrying a large volume of fixed-interest loan debt, South Korea managed to 
avoid financial trouble until the early 1980s, when global growth slowed in the wake of the second oil 
shock. The external shocks that hit South Korea during 1979–81 were actually larger than those 
experienced by a number of other countries discussed at this conference, including Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico (Balassa 1985, table 1). Although external debt and debt service ratios had increased 
substantially in the late 1970s, South Korea was able to resume high sustained growth by 1983, more 
rapidly than its comparators, through a combination of reduced imports associated with a sharp, though 
brief, decline in income, and real exchange rate depreciation, achieved through a 20 percent nominal 
devaluation. (The currency had also been devalued by 20 percent in 1974 following the first oil shock.) 
This pattern of precipitous income decline and real depreciation followed by rapid recovery was to be 
repeated in the 1997 crisis (Lee and Rhee 2000). The technocrats around Chun implemented a policy of 
macroeconomic stabilization through which they began to liberalize and deregulate the South Korean 
economy. A liberalization of the financial sector initiated under the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1982–86) and 
extended under the Sixth Five Year Plan (1987–91) attenuated “policy lending.” 
 
Domestic Finance 
 
The capital channeling development strategy pursued up through the 1980s rested on the twin pillars of 
financial repression and capital controls to delink the domestic and international financial markets. The 
government had to limit capital markets to institutions that could be dominated if not controlled, and it 
had to limit the firms’ financing options to those institutions. At the core was a positive list system 
through which anything not explicitly permitted was prohibited. This hampered the introduction of new 
instruments throughout the financial sector. In practice this meant emphasizing indirect finance and 
maintaining limitations on foreign participation in financial markets and domestic firm access to foreign 
capital. Presumptively less compliant foreign banks could not be allowed into the market in any significant 
way, for if they were allowed to establish a significant presence, they would undermine domestic banks 
operating under the burdens of “policy lending.”6 Thus the financial system had to be built around a 
                                                 
5 Chun literally scheduled early morning tutoring sessions. Perhaps there is something peculiarly Korean about this: 
It is hard to imagine the typical military dictator staying up late to study for his daily economics lesson. 
6 In the characterization of one South Korean economist: “Dominance of the Korean financial market by foreign 
institutions was abhorred, as it would deprive authority over various instruments of monetary control, weaken many 
customary, informal practices associated with industrial policy, and might also alter the public-good nature of the 
financial system” (Lee 1993, 7). 
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 relatively small number of South Korean banks, and corporate finance had to be largely limited, through 
regulatory fiat and tax provisions, to borrowing from those intermediaries.  
Alternative sources of corporate finance were suppressed: The development of money markets 
and bond markets was retarded and restricted to a limited range of maturities with no real secondary 
markets, and issuance was effectively dependent on bank guarantees. The government discouraged the 
development of an efficient auction and secondary market for government bonds, and no swap, bond, or 
interest futures markets existed. As for the stock market, in 1990 the government established a quarterly 
quota on new issues. Before the 1997 crisis, more than 360 companies were waiting to be listed (relative to 
the 776 that were already on the exchange). Criminal proceedings documented how firms resorted to 
bribing officials to bring their initial public offerings to the market.7 As a result of these policies, until the 
late 1980s corporate capital sourced through bank loans exceeded equity, bonds, and commercial paper 
combined, and indirect finance from all sources was the primary form of corporate finance until 1991 
(Cho 2002, table 4).  
There were multiple implications of these policies. First, the firms emphasized growth, not 
profitability, since risk was socialized and increased borrowing made further borrowing advantageous 
under the “too big to fail” notion, which was the government’s habitual interventions promoted. From 
the standpoint of a lender, the bigger the firm, the more creditworthy the firm, since size increased the 
likelihood that the government would intervene in the event that the firm got into financial trouble, which 
it did on a fairly routine basis. As growth became the name of the game, firms became extraordinarily 
leveraged.8 Loans were the mechanism for growth, and, paradoxically, debt signaled creditworthiness, a 
state of affairs that Yoo (1999) described as the “survival of the fattest.” Indeed, one study of corporate 
finance covering the decade 1977–86 found that “the largest firms have the weakest financial structure,” 
as measured by the degree of equity in their capital structures (Kim 1990, 342), while another found that 
the major chaebol were systematically less profitable than other South Korean firms (Krueger and Yoo 
2002). A corollary to this system of corporate financing was the encouragement of extensive cross-
shareholding, cross-loan guarantees, and nontransparency, all of which served to facilitate borrowing and 
to discriminate against outside shareholders. 
 
 
                                                 
7 In June 1996 the governor of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a director of the MOFE were 
arrested for taking bribes to get firms listed. Six other SEC executives were forced to resign.  
8 In July 1997, just prior to the crisis, the average debt-equity ratio of the 30 largest chaebol exceeded 400 percent 
(Yoo 1999, table 9). By the end of 1997, it stood at 500 percent, and 600 percent of the debt of subsidiaries was 
included on a consolidated basis (Claessens, Ghosh, and Scott 1999). See also Krueger and Yoo (2002, table 6).  
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 Capital Controls 
 
Comprehensive capital controls were used to insulate the domestic financial market from the global 
market.9 Inward remittances were monitored to impede unauthorized foreign exchange transactions and 
inward investments. Inward FDI was permitted in only a limited range of sectors, and was further 
discouraged by requirements governing minority ownership, technology transfer (in the absence of any 
intellectual property rights enforcement), and export. And while there were modest relaxations beginning 
in the late 1970s, actual FDI inflows remained minuscule until a wide-ranging liberalization was 
undertaken in response to the 1997 crisis (figure 4). On the eve of the crisis, South Korea and India were 
the only countries in Asia where the dominant modality of US foreign investment was minority-stake joint 
ventures, as opposed to majority-stake joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Stock market investment by nonresidents was prohibited until 1992 and then subject to stringent 
quantitative ceilings.10 At the time of the 1997 crisis, foreign ownership of listed companies was limited to 
20 percent of capital, with individual stakes limited to 5 percent. Investment by nonresidents in domestic 
bonds was prohibited until 1996 and then subject to quantitative limitations. The local presence and 
activity of foreign financial institutions were highly circumscribed.  
For much of this period, outbound investment was similarly restricted. Domestic residents were 
not permitted to open foreign bank accounts or purchase foreign securities, nor were foreign entities 
permitted to issue won-denominated securities domestically. Export earnings had to be repatriated within 
six months. Outward direct investment required official approval and was subject to regulations that had 
the effect of encouraging the intermediation of South Korean banks.11
The local currency, the won, was nonconvertible, and the South Korean government discouraged 
the development of any offshore market in won or won-denominated instruments. Beginning in 1985, a 
rapid real appreciation of the Japanese yen encouraged relocation of manufacturing activities from Japan 
to South Korea. The Bank of Korea accommodated the capital inflow, and between 1985 and 1989 the 
money supply increased by 105 percent, the price level rose by 3 percent, and the stock market increased 
by 458 percent, making it the world’s ninth largest in terms of capitalization.  
                                                 
9 See Linder (1994) and Kim, Kim, and Wang (2001) for descriptions. The appendix contains a detailed chronology 
of the policies applied. 
10 Initially this was set at 10 percent in January 1992 and subsequently raised to 12 percent in December 1994, 15 percent 
in July 1995, and 18 percent in April 1996. In June 1996 the government announced a further phased opening that would 
increase the ceiling to 20 percent in 1996 and three additional percentage points annually thereafter to 29 percent by 1999. 
The government added that it might abolish the ceiling entirely in 2000 if “economic circumstances” were appropriate.  
11 For example, there were restrictions on firms’ ability to issue securities abroad and on contracting foreign loans at 
rates more than 100 basis points above LIBOR.  
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 In February 1980, following a 20 percent devaluation the previous month, South Korea moved 
off a strict dollar peg and began pegging the won to a basket of currencies that constituted the Special 
Drawing Right (the respective weights in the basket were undisclosed) plus a “policy adjustment” factor. 
In the words of Jeffrey A. Frankel (1993), this was a basket peg “in name only.” As observed by Balassa 
and Williamson (1990), the policy adjustment factor predominated: Between 1984 and 1987 the won 
depreciated against all five currencies in the basket, generating an undervalued currency (I. Kim 1993). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was astute enough to classify South Korea’s exchange rate regime 
as a managed float rather than a basket peg. 
The undervalued won, relocation of productive activities from Japan to South Korea, and 
expansionary US macroeconomic policies generated a growing bilateral surplus with the United States 
(Noland 1993). Through the experience of the yen-dollar talks, the US political system had become 
enamored with negotiating with other countries over exchange rate and financial market policies. The 
United States initially sought to use the IMF’s special consultative mechanism to pressure South Korea 
over its exchange rate policy, despite the fact that as late as 1985 the Fund had been advising further 
depreciation of the won. Starting in 1986 the US Treasury began publicly to pressure South Korea to 
revalue the won. Although Japan was the primary focus of the financial provisions of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, South Korea emerged as a secondary target.  
In its first three congressionally mandated reports under Section 3004 of the trade act, the 
Treasury identified South Korea as an “exchange rate manipulator,” removing South Korea from the list 
in April 1990, after a new exchange rate management system called the market average exchange rate 
system was introduced. Under this arrangement, the midband won-dollar rate was calculated as an average 
of the previous day’s transactions and then allowed to float within officially prescribed margins around 
this rate. In 1991 the government began a process of very gradually widening the bands, with the putative 
expectation that as the bands were widened a freely floating exchange rate would emerge (B. Kim 1993). 
Needless to say, things did not work out this way.  
The pervasive pattern of government intervention created a symbiotic relationship between the 
government and the private sector, eroding private-sector autonomy and facilitating the corruption of the 
political system. The move toward more genuine political competition in the late 1980s arguably shifted the 
balance of power away from the government and toward the private sector, which became the source of badly 
needed campaign funds (Kang 2002a, 2002b). In the words of one contemporary observer, corruption 
“exploded” (Clifford 1997). With the exception of current President Roh Moo-hyun, every South Korean 
president since Park Chung-hee, at least one of his sons, or both have been imprisoned on corruption 
offenses.  
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 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN THE 1990s 
 
Over time, pressure for liberalization developed from both domestic firms disadvantaged in international 
competition by relatively high domestic interest rates and limited options for corporate finance and from 
the US government, which was promoting the interests of American financial service providers (figure 
6).12 The outcome of this tension was a political compromise, resulting in a gradual, uneven, and ultimately 
problematic liberalization program that both contributed to and was overtaken by the 1997 financial crisis. 
(A chronology of policies actually applied is provided in the appendix.) 
The United States began pressuring South Korea for improved market access for US financial 
services providers in the late 1980s, initiating a more or less ongoing process of bilateral consultations on 
the issue of financial market liberalization. The conclusion of the Sixth Five Year Plan (1986–91) provided 
Treasury officials an opening to talk to their South Korean counterparts about “the vision thing.”13 Some 
commentators (Park, Song, and Wang 2003) argue that these discussions formed the basis of the first of a 
series of multiyear financial sector policy plans, the most important of which was promulgated in 1995 and 
scheduled to run through 1999 (Kwon 1996).14 Additional reforms were announced as part of South 
Korea’s 1996 accession to the OECD, which itself was undertaken for largely politically symbolic reasons 
by President Kim Young-sam. Nevertheless, there was considerable domestic opposition to these 
initiatives (from underwriters of domestic securities, for example). Thus the 1995 plan and South Korea’s 
application to join the OECD became focal points in the internal battle over reform (as well as an 
opportunity for further US government pressure). 
Aspects of the plan were arguably captured by special interests through corruption. Part of the 
process of unifying the financial markets had been the regularization of curb market lenders as investment 
and finance companies. The traditional commercial banks began to get squeezed: Their share of deposits 
and lending fell steadily from roughly 80 percent in 1975 to less than 50 percent in 1990. This process 
accelerated in the mid-1990s when a new class of institutions—merchant banks, with a broader remit than 
                                                 
12 In figure 6 the interest rate differential is calculated as the difference between yields on South Korean won-
denominated 10-year government bonds and US government bonds of the same maturity. If one expected the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect to hold and the won to appreciate in real terms over the long run, then from the standpoint 
of a South Korean firm, the implicit differential was even larger.  
13 Wang (1993, 186) quotes the November 1991 Treasury report to Congress, mandated under Section 3004 of the 
trade act: “Most troubling at this stage is that the Korean government appears to lack a ‘vision’ and well-defined 
strategy for the liberalization of its financial markets. [Recent reforms] are steps in the right direction but do not 
appear to go fast enough. . . .”  
14 American demands for financial market opening are a hardy perennial. Invariant to partisan control of the 
government, they continue to this day. See Frankel (1989, 1993), Wang (1993), Blustein (2003), Stiglitz (2003), and 
USTR (2004) for examples. 
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 the existing nonbank financial intermediaries—was established. Merchant bank licenses were issued in two 
tranches in 1994 and 1996. Bribery and kickbacks dominated the issues of licenses, and a later 
investigation by the Board of Audit and Inspection determined that 3 of the 15 merchant banks approved 
in 1996 were insolvent when the licenses were issued (Haggard 2000). The merchant banks played a 
significant role in the subsequent crisis both at home and abroad through connected lending to their 
chaebol owners, particularly financing “unviable” investments in steel, automobiles, and chemicals during 
the mid-1990s investment boom and reckless investments in Russia and Southeast Asia (Ishii and 
Habermeier 2002, 69). The commercial banks were experiencing both erosion of market share and 
margins: In 1996 their share of deposits and lending had fallen to 33 percent and 43 percent, respectively, 
and returns on assets and equity were declining as well.   
Out of the OECD application process came a multiyear, phased, financial liberalization plan to 
break down some barriers within the domestic market and liberalize capital outflows before capital 
inflows. The plan amounted to a continuation of the ongoing liberalization on a variety of fronts, though 
many of its provisions would leave the government with significant discretion. It was unclear what 
controls would remain in 1999, the terminal year of the plan. At the end of 1995, domestic market interest 
rates had largely been freed (indeed, a year ahead of schedule). However, the government still regulated 
the portfolios of commercial banks. It still owned a large number of financial institutions (of which the 
Korea Development Bank was the largest), and state-owned financial institutions dominated some 
markets (such as mortgage lending). It announced in August 1996 that foreign investors would be allowed 
to invest in convertible bonds issued by large corporations beginning in 1998 but that full opening of the 
bond market would be delayed until the differential between Korean and overseas interest rates (at the 
time 500 to 600 basis points) narrowed to 200 basis points.15 Of course, there was no guarantee that this 
condition would ever be met. 
Government control over the introduction of new instruments had retarded innovation in the 
securities market before the plan’s introduction and would have continued to do so afterward if the plan 
had been implemented. Despite the decline of policy loans, the central bank would still act as a source of 
subsidized lending to preferred borrowers. Foreign participation in South Korean financial markets would 
continue to be circumscribed, and access by residents to international capital markets would still be 
restricted. Under this plan, the South Korean financial system would have remained among the most 
repressed in Asia. Reservations to OECD codes are permitted, and the average acceptance rate of 
financial liberalization codes in the financial services area is 89 percent; South Korea used its exceptions 
                                                 
15 The chaebol had been lobbying to be allowed access to foreign capital directly through the bond market. The 
government had been reluctant to do so, fearing that this would further advantage the chaebol relative to smaller 
firms, which would be less able to take advantage of this opportunity. The banks presumably also preferred their 
privileged position as financial intermediaries.  
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 remit liberally, accepting only 65 percent of the OECD’s financial system codes (though in fairness, some 
of these exceptions were scheduled for phase-out by 2000) (Dobson and Jacquet, 1998). A Presidential 
Commission for Financial Reform was established in January 1997 to propose broad follow-on 
recommendations for the modernization of the financial system (Cargill 1999). Needless to say, its 
recommendations were overtaken by events.  
The case for international financial market integration is well known: The benefits include 
enhanced opportunities for intertemporal consumption, greater opportunities for portfolio diversification 
and risk reduction for both borrowers and lenders, enhanced competition and technology transfer in both 
financial and nonfinancial sectors, and a reduction in systemic risk.  
Conversely, the symptoms of financial repression include low rates of return to savers, banking 
sector inefficiency manifested by high spreads between lending and deposit rates, poor allocation of funds 
across alternative uses, politicization of lending decisions, and the existence of large informal and unregulated 
credit markets (“the curb market”). Financial repression tends to retard the development of the economy by 
discouraging the accumulation of capital. Savers are offered low rates of return, while firms face a high cost of 
capital for their investment needs. At the same time, financial repression impedes the efficient allocation of 
what capital is accumulated. Projects are typically not funded according to their rates of return, but rather on 
the basis of noneconomic considerations, which may include political connections or bribery of the relevant 
officials.  
The likely result of financial repression is that the total amount of savings is lower than it should be, 
and the allocation of the total among its possible uses is inefficient. Disequilibrium in the financial markets 
generates rents that may be allocated through corruption. These distortions become severe when the real 
economy develops rapidly and profitable real investment opportunities abound yet the financial system lags 
behind. Capital controls act as an implicit tax on holders of government debt. By restricting international 
capital flows, the government can in effect force domestic residents to accept government debt at lower 
interest rates than would be the case if there were no controls on capital.  
These arguments are easily applicable to the South Korean case, and indeed supporting evidence 
could be observed contemporaneously—note that the citations for the next 10 paragraphs all refer to the 
precrisis literature. Opportunities for intertemporal consumption smoothing could be particularly 
important for a country like South Korea, where the rate of return on capital during this period was quite 
high (figure 5) and the economy was subject to major financial shocks such as the need to finance 
unification (Noland 1996b).16 With respect to portfolio diversification, during the period under 
consideration foreign investment in the South Korean stock market was legally restricted, and in statistical 
                                                 
16 See Cho (2002, figure 1) and Krueger and Yoo (2002, tables 3 and 4, figures 1 and 2) for alternative estimates of 
rates of return. 
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 terms it was “mildly segmented” from the rest of the world (Claessens and Rhee 1994, Watanabe 1996). There 
was even some evidence that the correlation between movements in the South Korean and foreign markets 
was declining, which would have enhanced the attractiveness of cross-border diversification. Although it was 
sometimes argued that foreign investment in the stock market amounted to “hot money,” the dominant 
behavior of foreign investors was to reinvest sales as part of the process of portfolio realignment (Jun 1995). 
Giovanni and deMelo (1993) estimate that in the case of South Korea for 1975–87, the “financial repression 
tax”—the reduction in borrowing costs to the central government generated by capital controls that 
effectively force domestic residents to invest in local instruments, or the implicit tax rate—was more than 5 
percent, amounting to 0.25 percent of national income, or 1 to 2 percent of actual tax revenues. 
Not only were the prospective gains to relaxation of capital controls discernable, but the implicit 
costs were also evident. There were enormous spreads across borrowers, reflecting the segmentation and 
repression of financial markets (figure 5). The South Korean financial services sector was bureaucratized, 
bloated, and backward. This was reflected in the low average rate of return on bank assets, which was among 
the lowest of those observed in emerging markets (Goldstein and Turner, 1996, table 5). The role of foreign 
firms was highly circumscribed. Systemic risk was a real concern given the highly concentrated South 
Korean industrial structure with respect to both firms (a relatively few firms accounted for a large share of 
national income) and the composition of output and exports (highly concentrated in a few products such 
as automobiles and computer chips). A relaxation in 1995 of bank provisioning requirements exacerbated 
the situation, as did the fragmented regulatory authority, in which the Bank of Korea was responsible for 
oversight of the commercial banks while “poor supervision [of the merchant banks] by the MOFE created 
the possibility for regulatory arbitrage and high risk practices” (Ishii and Habermeier 2002, 69).17 
Macroeconomic volatility was higher than in other Asian economies, and data from the BIS indicated that 
the risk-adjusted capital adequacy ratio of South Korean banks was among the lowest of all developing 
countries (Goldstein and Turner 1996). South Korean reluctance to deregulate reflected a mixture of 
motivations. There were two sorts of counterarguments offered in opposition to liberalization. The first 
                                                 
17 Writing prior to the crisis, I summarized the situation as follows: “The potential problem with the system is the 
implicit guarantee that banks not be allowed to fail; this together with deposit insurance, simultaneously creates an 
incentive for banks to seek risk, while it relieves depositors of the incentive to monitor bank health…. Moreover, the 
Korean definition of bad loans is narrower than that commonly used abroad, and foreign bankers estimate the true 
bad loan problem may be three times as large as admitted…. Concerns about the banking system are further 
aggravated by the MOFE's dual function as a promoter and supervisor of financial institutions, and legitimate 
questions can be raised about the degree of independence of the regulatory authorities. . . . The bottom line is that 
Korea should be concerned about the strength of its banking system, and much of this concern is related to 
domestic financial repression and is unrelated to the issue of external financial liberalization. Market discipline does 
not work when there is a lack of information, or when the notion that banks cannot fail is widely held. The 
appropriate responses are to deal with the structural problems of the banking system (which are likely to involve 
both domestic and international liberalization together with strengthened prudential supervision by public 
authorities), to strengthen public disclosure requirements, and to signal limits on public bail-outs” (Noland 1996a, 
12–14). 
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 was that the South Korean financial service firms simply could not compete. Some South Koreans 
probably opposed liberalization out of self-interest, since liberalization would erode their privileged position 
within the South Korean financial system. (Likewise, some foreign calls for opening the Korean financial 
market were surely motivated by self-interest.) For example, Park (1995, 7) argued, “Domestic financial 
institutions have little competitive advantage over their foreign counterparts. At best Korea’s financial 
sector remains an infant industry and may need market protection.”18 On some level this was undoubtedly 
true (and irrelevant): The South Korean banking sector was highly inefficient, as could easily be observed 
at the time, a condition that was subsequently confirmed by the industry’s postcrisis consolidation, which, 
despite a strong union presence in the industry, was accompanied by a roughly 40 percent decline in 
sectoral employment and no apparent diminution in service.  
A more serious argument was that destabilizing capital flows would create macroeconomic 
instability. Park and Song (1996, 14) wrote, “Korean policymakers have been reluctant to liberalize the 
capital account rapidly. There is concern that devastating macroeconomic instability would result from a 
sudden opening of financial markets. In contrast efficiency gains to the economy from liberalization are 
considered to be small, possibly even insignificant, and at best realized in the long run.” Johnston et al. 
(1999, 71) write that upon joining the OECD, South Korean government officials expressed their 
disinclination to ease capital controls further and explicitly stressed that they wished to maintain controls 
over short-term capital inflows, which could “hamper macroeconomic and financial market stability.” A 
major source of reluctance to remove barriers to capital inflows was the fear that inflows of reserves would 
increase the money supply excessively and lead to real exchange rate appreciation, either through inflation or 
through nominal appreciation of the currency.19
A striking aspect of the South Korean case is that while a variety of policy responses to this 
concern were suggested, it does not appear that any were seriously considered. One way of avoiding 
excessive appreciation would have been to continue to sterilize capital inflows, as South Korean policymakers 
had done throughout the 1980s and 1990s, by forcing domestic financial institutions to purchase monetary 
stabilization bonds (MSBs) to offset the expansionary impact on the money supply of foreign capital inflows. 
                                                 
18 Another South Korean economist wrote: “Unless the weakness in domestic financial institutions is improved, 
financial markets in Korea could eventually be controlled by foreign firms. Fortunately, [under the agreement with 
the OECD] it is predicted that liberalization of capital movements will not result in foreign control of domestic 
financial industries. Such prediction is supported by the fact that foreign banks operating in Korea have experienced 
a decline in their asset size, and foreign insurance firms’ market share is less than one percent. . . .” (Chae 1997, 71–
72).  
19 For example in an NBER paper, Cho and Koh (1996, 1) write: “With the current level of interest rate differentials 
between Korea and developed economies, drastic full-scale liberalization would certainly induce a large amount of 
capital inflows and appreciate the Korean won. This would affect the price competitiveness of Korean products in 
international markets, which could bring about significant macro-instability in an economy like Korea which relies 
heavily upon external transactions.”  
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 Indeed, research cited by Park (1995) indicated that the optimal policy from a South Korean standpoint would 
have been a mixture of exchange rate adjustment and sterilization. Sterilization may have been advisable in the 
short run, but it is doubtful whether this would have been a good long-term policy: Such a policy generates 
quasi-fiscal costs as long as the interest rate on the MSBs exceeds the return on holding foreign exchange (in 
the case of comparable Latin American countries, Leiderman [1995] estimated their annual costs at 0.25 
percent to 0.50 percent of national income). In any event, since domestic rates were higher than foreign rates, 
it would have been desirable to reduce domestic rates and obtain the benefits of higher investment and 
growth.20 Moreover, as domestic financial markets became more complex, the ability of the Bank of Korea to 
exercise monetary control through administrative guidance and MSBs would have been increasingly less 
possible, underscoring the advisability of developing the capacity for indirect control through open market 
operations. Another alternative proposed by Dornbusch and Park (1995) was for the government to create a 
long-term (six years or more) won currency bond exclusively for foreigners for use in sterilizing capital 
inflows. 
If it is not possible to adequately sterilize or otherwise offset inflows, and the capital inflows are 
financing consumption (instead of investment), another response would be to reintroduce some controls on 
capital inflows, presumably in the form of “Tobin taxes,” which would throw some sand in the external 
financial market wheels.21 Dornbusch and Park (1995), Park (1995), and Park and Song (1996) devoted 
considerable effort to thinking about this in the South Korean context. They raised two possibilities, which 
they appeared to regard as temporary measures for extreme situations. The first was a variable deposit 
requirement (VDR), in which reserve or deposit requirements are imposed on capital inflows, with the deposit 
varying according to type of inflow and investor. It is possible, in principle, that the reserve requirement could 
be set so that the opportunity cost of the deposit sitting in a non-interest-bearing Bank of Korea account 
would exactly offset the international interest rate differential. Apparently the legal framework existed for the 
imposition of this deposit requirement, and existing procedures would make it feasible to impose this on 
foreigners. The main problem (beyond damage to future credibility with foreign investors) would appear to be 
that this would also most certainly generate conflicts with foreign governments and investors and, depending 
on its implementation, possibly amount to a violation of South Korea’s WTO commitments. These 
                                                 
20 Park (1995) suggested central bank swaps as a possible alternative to sterilization. When central bank foreign 
exchange holdings got too high, the central bank would sell foreign exchange to domestic financial institutions to invest 
abroad. At the end of a specified time, the swap would be reversed, and the central bank would compensate financial 
institutions for losses due to interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements. The problem, as in the case of 
sterilization, is that the quasi-fiscal cost could be high.  
 21 If the foreign capital inflows were going into productivity-enhancing investment, the proper response would be to 
allow the exchange rate to appreciate with productivity gains and allow the capital inflows to continue.  
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 emergency safeguards were to be explicitly authorized postcrisis in the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act of 
1999. 
The alternative to controlling quantity (in terms of setting the size of the deposit) would be to control 
price, and Park and Song raised the issue of a transaction tax, for which, like the VDR, the necessary legal 
framework apparently already existed. The transactions tax could be confined to capital account transactions 
and in principle could be imposed solely on foreigners. Like the VDR, this would surely raise hackles with 
foreign firms and governments. Moreover, although the won could not legally trade outside South Korea, it is 
hard to see why interested parties could not simply move their activities offshore and avoid the tax. More 
generally, the market for the won was already relatively thin, and it is not clear that reducing the volume of 
transactions would be desirable. 
Finally, one might fight destabilizing inflows by encouraging outflows. At first blush, encouraging 
outflows to offset inflows would appear to be the natural response to concerns about excessive net inflows. 
There are two arguments as to why encouraging outflows may actually exacerbate the problem, however. 
First, barriers to outflows create an element of irreversibility to foreign investors, and if there is uncertainty 
about the future conduct of economic policy, then this irreversibility may deter investment. Elimination of 
irreversibility through the removal of capital controls could reduce foreign investor caution and paradoxically 
lead to higher net inflows. Second, since barriers to external flows are sometimes maintained to facilitate the 
collection of financial repression taxes, the removal of the impediments may be regarded as a signal of a lower 
permanent rate of taxation on capital and thus can induce capital inflow. It is unclear whether either of these 
arguments carried much force in the South Korean case. 
In any event, South Korean authorities appeared to be proceeding more rapidly with liberalization on 
outbound flows than on inbound flows. To the extent that one believes that domestic residents, for 
conventional portfolio diversification reasons, wish to hold foreign currency assets and have been prevented 
from doing so, the elimination of these impediments would encourage capital outflow. If the fundamental 
concern about external financial liberalization is that it would lead to destabilizing net inflows, the South 
Korean policy amounted to firing the guns before the enemy was in sight.  
Not only that, the effect of government policy was to encourage those inflows to take the form of 
short-term lending to South Korean banks. The closure to foreign investors of the long-term corporate 
bond market created the perverse incentive of raising capital through short-term borrowing. This was 
significant because South Korean firms were highly concentrated in relatively footloose manufacturing 
industries and subject to contentious labor relations at home. As a consequence, South Korean firms 
began investing abroad at a scale that was unusually large for an economy at its level of income and 
industrial development. 
In 1993 the government expanded the scope for short-term foreign currency borrowing by 
allowing firms to borrow abroad directly or through South Korean banks to finance the importation of 
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 capital goods (figure 7). With interest rates relatively high in South Korea and continued restrictions on 
firms’ ability to issue long-term bonds or secure long-term loans in foreign markets still in effect, firms 
were encouraged to increase their reliance on short-term foreign borrowing, and South Korean banks 
were encouraged to step up their on-lending activities (figure 8).22  
The following year, the government removed restrictions on banks’ foreign currency loans, 
resulting in a massive increase in net foreign currency liabilities (figure 8). Moreover, the Bank of Korea 
applied window guidance to limit medium- and long-term borrowing on international markets, apparently 
due to concerns about potential loss of control over domestic financial institutions through debt-equity 
swaps, which bias borrowing toward the short end of the term spectrum (Johnston et al. 1999). Short-
term external debt rose from $40 billion in 1993 to $98 billion at the end of September 1997, representing 
more than half of external liabilities and more than three times the amount of foreign exchange reserves 
(figure 9). The growth of short-term debt outstripped the growth in usable reserves, raising the specter of 
a liquidity crunch. The ratio of usable international reserves—official reserves less the amount of illiquid 
funds that had been deposited at overseas bank branches to cover short-term debt repayments—to short-
term debt declined from 42 percent in 1993 to 29 percent at year-end 1996 (Chopra et al. 2002). 
“Supply-side” effects through the Basel Accords reinforced these “demand-side” factors. Lending 
to other OECD banks, irrespective of the term of the loan, is assigned a risk weight of 20 percent in the 
capital adequacy requirements. However, in the case of non-OECD banks, the assessments vary with the 
term of the loan: Loans of less than one-year duration receive the 20 percent risk weight while those with 
a duration of more than one year are assigned a 100 percent risk rate. Since all corporate lending receives 
the 100 percent risk weight, Basel Accord incentives arguably encouraged lending to South Korea to take 
the form of short-term bank lending, reinforcing South Korean government policy (Johnston et al. 1999). 
When South Korea joined the OECD, the effect was to reduce the risk premium on lending to South 
Korea. 
The net result was currency and term mismatching on a massive scale. One way of getting a 
handle on the implications of this is suggested by Goldstein and Turner (2004), who propose an aggregate 
effective currency mismatch measure—the net foreign currency asset position normalized by a country’s 
export openness and the foreign currency share of total debt—as a shorthand stress indicator of the 
vulnerability of an economy to an exchange rate depreciation. Figure 10 shows that, in the absence of a 
significant increase in export openness, South Korea moved from a small net negative position in 1994 
(i.e., an exchange rate depreciation would slightly reduce the net worth of the economy) to a sizeable 
                                                 
22 Further impetus was provided in October 1995 when the government announced that, in the case of direct 
investments abroad by South Korean corporations of $100 million or more, at least one fifth of the funds would 
have to be raised at home. 
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 negative position in 1996, as the economy experienced a 10-fold rise in net currency liabilities and a 
smaller increase in the foreign currency share of total debt. The implication of this movement for the 
Goldstein-Turner measure was that, heading into 1997, South Korea was both more likely to experience a 
currency collapse and that such an event would have a severe impact on the economy.23 Unlike the 
analysis of internal vulnerabilities, which could be easily observed contemporaneously, few if any analysts 
properly understood the external vulnerabilities created by the borrowing activities of overseas bank 
affiliates.  
 
THE 1997 CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH 
  
Between 1994 and 1996 South Korea experienced an investment boom that was increasingly financed by 
mismatched foreign borrowing. Unlike in Southeast Asia, where the investment boom was concentrated 
in the real estate sector, much of the capital was flowing into manufacturing, presumptively giving less 
cause for concern.24 However, a substantial share was invested in industries that were already arguably 
characterized by excess capacity, and by the mid-1990s South Korea was experiencing slowing total factor 
productivity growth, deteriorating terms of trade, and declining profitability. South Korea’s largest export 
market, Japan, went into recession in 1996, and the yen began to depreciate significantly against the dollar, 
generating an effective real appreciation of the won. Export growth slowed in 1996 and turned negative 
the following year. Stock market prices, which peaked in 1994, accelerated their decline.  
As conditions worsened in 1996, the margin of error for the highly leveraged chaebol evaporated. 
In January 1997 Hanbo Steel, the 17th largest chaebol ranked by sales, collapsed amid $6 billion of 
outstanding debts. The collapse of Hanbo, the first major chaebol to go bankrupt in more than a decade, 
was to have repercussions beyond its debts: A subsequent series of bribery arrests culminating in the arrest 
and conviction of President Kim Young-sam’s son and political confidante, Kim Hyun-chol, shook the 
political establishment and greatly damaged the elder Kim. The Hanbo collapse was followed by the 
failures of two more chaebol, driving up interest rates in the large corporate bond market and imposing 
negative externalities on all corporate borrowers. During the second quarter of 1997, spreads on South 
Korean government bonds began to widen, while, as points of comparison, those on Indonesian and 
                                                 
23 To be clear, the effective mismatch index is retrospective—the data requirements preclude contemporaneous 
calculation of the measure. However, the index is now reported on the Asian Development Bank’s 
AsianBondsOnline website: http://asianbondsonline.adb.org/asianbondindicators/ave_effect_currmsmatch.php. 
24 There is a gargantuan literature on the South Korean crisis of 1997–98. For entry points into this literature, see 
Wang and Zang (1998), Noland (2000), Smith (2000), Coe and Kim (2002), and websites maintained by the National 
Bureau for Economic Research, www.nber.org/~confer/2000/korea00/korea00.html, and Nouriel Roubini, 
www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/. 
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 Malaysian government bonds remained unchanged. The market was signaling an increase in South Korean 
country risk. The turning point arguably came in June with the failed nationalization of Kia, the country’s 
third largest automaker.  
 Despite these worsening conditions, the vulnerability of the South Korean economy was not 
universally appreciated, neither by forecasters, whose expectations for the South Korean economy were 
myopic in the extreme (figure 11), South Korean government officials, nor the IMF.25
If domestic turmoil had been its only problem, South Korea might have been able to avoid the 
conflagration that was to engulf it. Instead, in the second half of 1997 South Korea was rocked by the 
shocks emanating from the financial crisis that had seized Southeast Asia and from an emerging banking 
crisis in Japan, its principal source of foreign loans. The South Korean economy was adversely affected 
through three channels: spillovers in real terms as the depreciations of its competitors (especially Taiwan) 
effectively acted as competitive devaluations; contagion in financial terms; and a precipitous decline in 
rollover rates as Japanese banks hunkered down. The result was a collapse in private capital inflows  
(figure 4). 
These forces put considerable downward pressure on the won in the latter part of 1997. South 
Korean authorities spent billions of dollars in an unsuccessful attempt to maintain their quasi-peg, but by 
December they were forced to abandon any pretense of controlling the exchange rate.26 The currency 
went into freefall. Developments in the currency market rebounded on the domestic financial system. As 
the exchange rate collapsed, financial and nonfinancial firms with unhedged foreign currency–
denominated debt were crushed by a mounting debt burden in domestic resource cost terms. By year’s 
end the stock market had lost more than half its value in a period of eight months. 
South Korea initially sought assistance from Japan and the United States bilaterally, and after 
being rebuffed, approached the IMF. The Fund, the multilateral development banks, and bilateral donors 
agreed to contribute to a rescue. Agreement was reached in November on a $57 billion package—then, at 
nearly 20 times South Korea’s IMF quota, the largest in history—in return for broad, though vaguely 
                                                 
25 For example, the head of one government think tank, after accurately diagnosing the labor problems, loss of 
political confidence, and macroeconomic imbalances emerging in South Korea, in a public address in Washington in 
April 1997, dismissed concerns over the short-term debt and concluded: “There is, in fact, no economic crisis in 
Korea, if, by a crisis, we mean that there is imminent danger to the national economy—as was the case with Mexico 
in 1994” (Young 1997, 4). He was not alone—as late as September 1997, IMF missions to Seoul were giving the 
economy a clean bill of health.  
26 On August 27 a high ranking official of Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), in one of history’s weirder 
abuses of metaphor, told a Seoul press conference that the BOK would defend its “Maginot Line” of 900 won to the 
dollar. Unfortunately, this new Maginot Line was as ineffective as the original, and the level was soon breached. The 
BOK continued to intervene in the foreign exchange market in a futile attempt to defend the won. On November 
17, in a press conference that would have been farcical if not for the stakes, MOFE officials again invoked the 
“Maginot Line” imagery, solemnly declaring that they would defend their newest line of 1,000 won to the dollar. 
They spent billions of dollars trying, but the following day the barrier was breached once again. 
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 worded reforms. All three candidates in the ongoing presidential campaign promptly denounced this 
agreement. The National Assembly refused to consider a package of financial reform legislation proposed 
by MOFE, and the bank regulators marched on the National Assembly to protest their possible 
reorganization. Moreover, given the vagueness of the reform commitments, outside observers expressed 
skepticism about their eventual implementation. South Korean asset prices continued to plummet. On 
December 18 a former political dissident, Kim Dae-jung, was elected president. The following week, 
default was avoided when a second agreement, involving expedited disbursements, was concluded, and 
William McDonough, chairman of the New York Federal Reserve, persuaded the international banks to 
keep their credit lines open. Ultimately, South Korea’s creditors were persuaded to exchange their existing 
short-term loans for government-guaranteed bonds of longer maturity.27
In negotiating the second package, the Fund extracted significant policy commitments, including 
both monetary and fiscal tightening (despite the fact that the 1996 general government budget surplus was 
5 percent of GDP), as well as a variety of structural reforms, some unrelated to the financial crisis, such as 
the removal of the ban on the importation of Japanese automobiles. Although trade liberalization had 
been a staple of other IMF programs, the inclusion of these items contributed to the perception in South 
Korea that the IMF was simply being used as a tool of Japanese, and especially US, commercial policy.  
Feldstein (1998) argues that the South Korean case could be thought of as a fundamentally well-
functioning economy experiencing a temporary liquidity crisis. Had the Fund initially acted to coordinate a 
restructuring of private sector lending while providing temporary credits (in essence a bridge loan), the 
huge official money package could have been avoided and along with it the intrusive conditionality that 
the Fund demanded as part of the second deal. Indeed, South Korea ultimately borrowed less than $29 
billion, and in fact did not draw down the entire IMF portion of the loan.  
The South Korean crisis presented the IMF, the major finance ministries, and the multilateral 
development banks with a difficult situation. It occurred in the context of a cascading set of crises, which 
threatened to spread to Brazil and Russia. The South Korean government’s willingness to guarantee the 
short-term foreign debt of private entities socialized risk, creating moral hazard and ultimately increasing 
the severity of the crisis. It waited too long to approach the Fund, and once it did, engaged in unhelpful 
tactics such as leaking confidential documents. The Fund and its allies had little control over these events, 
and confronted in November 1997 a situation that arguably posed a systemic risk to the international 
financial system. 
When push came to shove, the Fund and its collaborators provided South Korea with an 
enormous package, far beyond its past lending practices in other cases, and a timely infusion of cash that 
undoubtedly prevented a chaotic default. That said, the macroeconomic conditionality imposed on South 
                                                 
27 See IMF (2003) for a detailed description of the coordinated rollover. 
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 Korea was too severe.28 It needlessly intensified the recession, which was to come to be known 
colloquially as “the IMF recession,” as the growth rate collapsed from 7 percent in 1996 to –7 percent in 
1998 before rebounding to more than 10 percent in 1999 (figure 1). Yet the South Korean economy had 
been beset with some significant structural problems, and given the enormity of the December 1997 
standby agreement, considerable demands for structural reform could be expected, at least with regard to 
financial market regulation and corporate governance. Other aspects of the program, requiring specific 
trade and labor market reforms, or demanding an independent central bank with price stability as its sole 
mandate, were intrusive and at best only tangentially connected to the crisis.29 Yet one could argue that the 
existence of such a demanding international organization allowed Kim Dae-jung to advance his own 
relatively liberal economic agenda more effectively than if the Fund or some similar organization had not 
existed. 
In a sense South Korea benefited from the vagaries of the electoral calendar—President Kim 
entered the Blue House essentially owing nothing to the dominant interests in the society and could blame 
the mishap on his predecessor. Given this freedom to maneuver, he moved resolutely to extract 
concessions from both the labor unions and the chaebol. In the financial sector, the government 
immediately closed two brokerage houses and a number of merchant banks (including some affiliated with 
chaebol). The government began the process of auctioning off two nationalized commercial banks, while 
putting other financial institutions on short tethers. Despite the austerity and dislocation that would 
accompany restructuring, the financial markets responded positively to these actions.  
The crisis forced a restructuring of South Korea’s systems of finance, regulation, and corporate 
governance, and a dismantling of the pervasive controls on international capital flows that characterized 
the precrisis regime. Since the crisis, South Korea has arguably made better progress on economic reform 
than the other heavily affected Asian crisis countries, or Japan for that matter. 
One manifestation of this progress has been an increase in FDI. As noted earlier, before the 
crisis, South Korea was unusual in that the dominant modality of investment was minority-stake joint 
ventures. FDI spiked in 1999 and 2000 and has fallen considerably since then (Kim 2004, table 1). The 
temporary hike in large part stemmed from foreign minority partners buying out their South Korean 
counterparts—given the opacity of South Korean accounting practices at the time, incumbent investors 
                                                 
28 There is a substantial academic literature on the monetary policy aspects of the crisis response that reaches 
ambiguous conclusions about the interest rate increases embodied in the Fund program. There is less disagreement 
that fiscal tightening was inappropriate. See IMF (2003) for a review. 
29 The Fund appears to have belatedly acquiesced on this point, observing that “the IMF may have been better 
advised to confine its advice and conditionality to a narrower range of issues, and then let the Korean authorities 
define their own agenda for implementation on a more focused set of policy issues” (IMF 2003, 111). 
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 were uniquely informed about the franchise value of these businesses.30 Subsequent FDI has mostly taken 
the form of greenfield investments.  
In the financial sector, prudential regulation has been consolidated and strengthened through the 
creation of the Financial Supervisory Commission and the introduction of new regulatory practices, 
approaches, and standards. Competition was injected into the financial sector by the increased role of 
foreigners through a variety of institutional arrangements. What appears to be more difficult to change has 
been the lending culture of South Korean financial institutions (Mann 2000). In the aftermath of the crisis, 
lenders went from bingeing on corporate lending to bingeing on household lending: South Korean 
household debt registered the fastest growth in the world, increasing 18 percentage points of GDP in two 
years, before ending in crisis with the insolvency of the country’s largest credit card issuer.31 A current 
challenge centers on the rapidly growing use of financial derivatives by South Korean financial institutions 
and the concern that the regulatory regime may not have kept pace with financial innovation. 
Nevertheless, the improvement in the function of South Korea’s financial system can be seen in 
firm-level balance sheet data: South Korean corporations on the whole have reduced their leverage, and 
access to capital increasingly is a function of profitability (Alexander 2003). This development is, in turn, 
facilitated by improved corporate governance through enhanced financial transparency, stricter 
enforcement of existing laws, and expanded scope for minority shareholders to seek legal redress.  
What has not happened is the development of independent institutional investors capable of 
monitoring management. To the extent that such institutional investors exist in South Korea, they tend to 
be affiliated with the major chaebol, and though some foreign institutional investors and the nascent 
shareholder rights movement have exerted some salutary influence, it is fair to say that the country still 
lacks a real market for corporate control. South Korean equity markets have become more integrated with 
markets elsewhere. In part this increase reflects the natural integration of markets following the removal 
of restrictions on foreign ownerships of South Korean stocks (foreigners now own more than 40 percent 
of the shares on the Korean Stock Exchange) and the removal of restrictions on South Korean residents’ 
ability to invest abroad. Yet despite these developments, the interest rate spread on South Korean debt 
remains higher than it was precrisis (figure 12). 
In June 1998 the government announced a plan to liberalize all foreign exchange transactions in 
two stages. The first stage took effect April 1, 1999, with the implementation of the Foreign Exchange 
Transaction Act, which liberalized most existing restrictions on current account transactions and 
established a negative list system for capital account transactions under which transactions are legal unless 
                                                 
30 One issue is whether these acquisitions amounted to a “fire sale” of assets by financially distressed South Korean 
firms. Econometric results reported by Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2004) suggest not.  
31 See IMF (2004) for a summary of the credit card debacle. 
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 stipulated by law or decree. (See K. Kim 2001, appendix, for a complete description.) The second stage of 
the exchange control liberalization took effect January 1, 2002. 
In April 2002 the government announced “The Plan for the Development of the Korean Foreign 
Exchange Market,” which envisioned full liberalization of foreign exchange regulations by 2011 as part of 
the government’s attempt to establish South Korea as a regional business hub for Northeast Asia. At 
present the exchange rate system is classified by the IMF as independently floating in an inflation-targeting 
framework. In recent years exchange rate interventions have been sizable, however, and would appear to 
go beyond the smoothing operations as characterized by the Fund and instead involve an attempt to 
prevent appreciation of the won. As of August 2004, South Korea has accumulated $171 billion in official 
reserves, and exchange rate policy and the magnitude of currency market interventions have emerged as a 
source of controversy within the South Korean government.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
South Korea is a fascinating case, in that it combines the characteristics of sustained prosperity, capital 
controls, and financial crisis in a striking manner. Pervasive capital controls, which delinked South Korea’s 
internal financial markets from the rest of the world, were a necessary component of the country’s capital 
channeling development strategy. This strategy clearly was consistent with rapid and sustained economic 
development, though it may or may not have been causal.  
These interventions create domestic political constituencies for both their perpetuation and 
dissolution, and the implementation of liberalization programs will reflect political competition among 
these groups. Transition is also affected by the demands of foreign financial services providers, which, 
having developed greater efficiency in a more competitive environment, regard the protected market as an 
opportunity. All of these phenomena are evident in the South Korean case. 
Because of its somewhat amorphous nature, perhaps the most difficult challenge is the legacy of 
financial repression in “dumbing down” both private sector actors and their public sector regulatory 
counterparts. The main ongoing concern in South Korea is not the macroeconomic adjustment to the 
removal of capital controls per se, but rather the lingering concerns about both the lending culture of 
South Korean financial sector firms and the capacity of South Korean authorities to successfully regulate 
the more complex financial system enabled by liberalization. 
The obvious question is whether South Korea could have developed a more dynamic and market-
oriented financial system in the presence of international capital controls. In theory there is no reason this 
could not have happened if South Korea had chosen this path. Indeed, the strengthening of domestic 
financial institutions prior to opening the capital account is a staple of the sequencing literature, and South 
Korea in the late 1980s appeared to meet the basic preconditions for a successful transition, such as fiscal 
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 health (Edwards 1989). Similarly one can imagine a greater (or lesser) role for foreign financial service 
providers under a variety of institutional and regulatory constructs. Yet it is doubtful whether this could 
have been obtained in practice. Neither South Korean government officials nor the intelligentsia evinced 
much ideological commitment to the notion of freer financial markets, and perhaps more importantly, 
there were some very large and powerful interest groups that were opposed to liberalization. For better or 
worse, given the specifics of the South Korean situation, freer international capital flows, a less regulated 
domestic financial system, and an increased role for foreign financial service providers were probably not 
greatly separable components of financial sector reform. 
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 APPENDIX: Chronology of Capital Flow Liberalization in South Korea 
 
This appendix provides a timeline of capital flow liberalization in South Korea. It is derived primarily, 
though not exclusively, from Johnston et al. (1999) and the Bank of Korea website, www.bok.or.kr. The 
chronology is organized by topic: foreign direct investment (FDI), followed by portfolio investment, other 
capital flows, capital market organization, and foreign exchange. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
  
1983 
• Revision of Foreign Capital Inducement Law establishes principle that inward FDI, subject to 
approval, is permitted except in specific “negative list” sectors.  
 
1985  
• More than 100 sectors are eliminated from the “negative list.” “Liberalization ratio” (share of 
industries open to FDI) reaches 76 percent, 92 percent in manufacturing.  
 
1986 
• Initial liberalization of restrictions on direct investment abroad begins. 
 
1987  
• 26 manufacturing additional sectors are eliminated from “negative list.”  
• Tax incentives for FDI in strategic sectors are reduced. 
 
1988 
• Restrictions on FDI in advertising, motion pictures, and insurance are relaxed.  
 
1989 
• Six manufacturing sectors are opened to FDI, raising the “liberalization ratio” to 79 percent, 98 
percent in manufacturing. 
• Limit on automatic approval is raised to $5 million from $3 million. 
 
1990 
• The limit on automatic approval is raised to $100 million from $3 million.  
• Two more sectors are opened to FDI. 
 
1991 
• The approval requirement is replaced with notification system for projects with foreign 
participation of less than 50 percent.  
• Exemptions are granted to foreign firms on corporate profit taxes for three years, while a 50 
percent exemption is established for the two successive years. 
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 • Restrictions on foreign ownership of retail businesses are relaxed. 
 
1992 
• The approval requirement is replaced by a notification system for investments in most business 
sectors. 
 
1994 
• The Foreign Capital Inducement Act is amended to streamline application procedures. Rules on 
land ownership are relaxed. 
 
1995 
• Investment in 101 sectors is permitted or greatly liberalized. 
 
1997 
• In August, the debt limits on corporations making overseas direct investments, whereby 20 
percent of investments exceeding $100 million had to be financed by a firm’s own capital, were 
abolished 
 
1998 
• Foreign Investment Promotion Act establishes the principle of national treatment; further 
narrows the “negative list” down to 5 percent of all sectors and 1 percent of manufacturing—22 
sectors including real estate rentals and sales, land development, waterworks, and investment 
companies and trusts fully open to foreign investment; broadens the scope of tax incentives 
available to foreign investors; simplifies approval procedures; and establishes foreign investment 
zones. 
 
1999 
• Five more categories including book publishing, alcoholic beverages, external maritime transport, 
blood-related products, and casinos are fully opened. 
• Investment in foreign real estate by domestic entities is permitted. 
 
2000 
• Regulations on FDI are brought into compliance with OECD standards. 
• Cattle husbandry and news agencies are partly liberalized. 
 
2001 
• Meat wholesaling is partly liberalized. 
 
Present situation: Twenty-nine out of 1,121 industries remain partially or completely closed to FDI. There 
is no limit on the amount that corporations can invest abroad, but all direct investments require 
notification of the corporations’ banks and, for financial, banking, and insurance companies, acceptance is 
required by the MOFE. Notification of the BOK and foreign exchange banks is also required for 
purchases of foreign real estate by domestic companies or purchases of domestic real estate by foreigners. 
Minimum standards of domestic companies’ foreign exchange earnings must be met in order for them to 
establish branches overseas. 
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 Portfolio investment 
 
 
1984 
• The Korea Fund is listed on the NYSE, providing international investors with an indirect means 
of investing in the Korean stock market. 
 
1985 
• South Korean firms are allowed to issue depository notes and warrants up to 15 percent of their 
outstanding share volume provided that no single foreign entity can acquire more than 3 percent 
of the capital by exercising conversion rights.  
 
1987 
• The Korea Europe fund is established, further enabling foreigners to invest in the stock market. 
• Inward remittances greater than $20,000 are monitored to discourage investments in the stock 
exchange.  
 
1989 
• Foreigners are allowed to trade among themselves. South Korean shares are permitted to be 
acquired through the exercise of bond conversion rights. 
• Foreign exchange banks are allowed to issue foreign currency bonds off-shore and to underwrite 
and trade foreign currency bonds issued by nonresidents. 
 
1990 
• The government allows the three domestic investment trusts each to establish a $100 million fund 
(of which $60 million are to be raised abroad) to invest in South Korean companies (70 percent 
of the capital) and foreign securities. 
 
1991 
• The Korea Asia Fund is established. 
• Nonresidents are allowed to convert into won up to $100,000 to invest in development trusts 
with a maturity of more than 2 years.  
• Securities in foreign currencies permitted to be issued by residents to finance import of inputs and 
machinery for which no domestic substitute is available.  
• Nonresidents who had acquired South Korean shares through convertible bonds are allowed to 
trade them in the stock exchange. 
 
1992 
• Foreign investment directly in the South Korean stock market by nonresidents, subject to ceilings 
of 3 percent for a particular investor and 10 percent for foreign investors in the aggregate, is 
permitted. 
• Investments in stocks by resident foreign financial institutions are subjected to the same limits as 
those of institutions owned by nationals.  
• Authorization for the issuance abroad of bonds, callable bonds, warrants, and stock depository 
receipts by residents is simplified, and receipts can be maintained in accounts abroad.  
 
1993 
• Issues of securities denominated in foreign currency are not subject to permission but only to 
reporting requirements; the class of eligible issuers is widened to include those with positive 
cumulative profits over the past three years.  
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1994 
• Ceiling on nonresidents’ holdings of individual South Korean firms’ capital is raised from 10 to 12 
percent. Nonresidents’ holdings of individual South Korean public corporations is allowed, up to 
an 8 percent ceiling.  
 
1995 
• Ceiling on nonresidents’ holdings of private South Korean firms’ capital is raised from 12 to 15 
percent. 
• Brokers are allowed to engage in foreign exchange transactions related to nonresident investments 
in the stock market. 
• Issuance of exchangeable bonds overseas is permitted, provided that they do not exceed 15 
percent of the firm’s capital.  
• Limits on offshore security issuance by small and medium-sized companies are relaxed.  
 
1996 
• Investment in domestic bonds by foreigners is allowed through the $100 million Korea Bond 
Fund listed in London.  
• Limits on foreign ownership of listed Korean firms are raised to 20 percent and 15 percent for 
private and public enterprises, respectively; ceiling on individual ownership is increased to 5 
percent. 
• Up to 50 percent of won-denominated securities issued by nonresidents can be sold abroad. 
 
1997 
• Foreigners can collectively purchase up to 30 percent of convertible bonds issued by small and 
medium-sized companies and only 5 percent individually.  
• In June regulations are relaxed so that foreign investors are allowed access to nonguaranteed 
bonds of small and medium-sized companies (maturities over three years and up to 50 percent of 
the amount listed) and of conglomerates (up to a 30 percent limit of an issue, together with a 6 
percent individual limit).  
• The issue abroad of won-denominated securities requires approval by the MOFE. The issue of 
foreign currency–denominated securities must be reported to the MOFE. 
• On December 11 authorities raise the ceiling on aggregate foreign ownership of listed Korean 
shares from 26 to 50 percent and the individual ceiling from 7 to 50 percent; they eliminate all 
limits on foreign investment in nonguaranteed bonds issued by small and medium-sized 
companies and allow foreign investment in the guaranteed corporate bond market (for maturities 
greater than three years) with limits at 10 percent and 30 percent for individuals and in aggregate, 
respectively.  
• On December 12 authorities raise aggregate limits for foreign investment in nonguaranteed 
corporate (convertible) bonds from 30 to 50 percent.  
• On December 23 authorities allow foreigners to invest in government and special bonds, up to 
the aggregate ceiling of 30 percent, and eliminate all individual limits for foreign investment in 
corporate bonds.  
• On December 30 authorities eliminate all foreign investment ceilings for the government, special, 
and corporate bond markets, including for maturities of less than three years; lift the restriction 
on foreign borrowing of over three years’ maturity; and raise the aggregate ceiling on foreign 
investment in Korean equities to 55 percent. 
 
 
 
 28
 1998 
• Restrictions on the amount of foreign investment in Korean equities are lifted, domestic bond 
and money markets are opened to foreigners. 
 
1999 
• Offshore issuance of securities with a maturity of less than one year by domestic entities is 
permitted. 
• Issuance of won-denominated and foreign currency–denominated securities by foreign entities is 
permitted.  
• Investment in foreign financial and insurance markets by domestic entities is permitted. 
 
Present situation: Ceilings on purchases of Korean stocks remain in place for 23 domestic firms. 
 
 
Other Capital Flows 
 
1981 
• Issuance of foreign beneficiary certificates by Korean trust companies is allowed. 
 
1985 
• Some restrictions on foreign loans to domestic firms are relaxed.  
 
1986 
• Regulations on foreign currency loans are tightened. 
 
1987 
• The government directs financial institutions to repay foreign short-term borrowing and bank 
loans that bear “unfavorable conditions.” Special deposits by the central bank are made at Korean 
foreign exchange banks for this purpose. 
 
1988 
• Nonresidents are prohibited from converting in won amounts withdrawn from their accounts. 
Sales of foreign currency by nonresidents to domestic banks are limited to $10,000. 
• Limits on banks’ foreign exchange loans to small and medium-sized enterprises and export firms 
are strictly enforced.  
 
1989 
• A limit of $200 million is set on special foreign currency loans granted to a firm during a year. 
• Currency loans are now admissible for investment operations abroad, subject to a 10-year 
maturity limit and ceilings of 60 percent and 80 percent of the investment for large and small 
firms, respectively.  
• The amount of foreign currency allowed in the country without notification to the tax authorities 
is raised in two steps to $10,000.  
 
1990 
• Central bank loans for the redemption of the foreign currency loans by banks and firms are 
abolished.  
 
 
 
 29
 1991 
• Limits on foreign currency loans for investments abroad are reduced to 40 percent and 60 percent 
of the total for large and small enterprises, respectively. 
 
1992 
• The maximum amount of loans of overseas investments is increased to 60 percent and 70 percent 
for large and small enterprises, respectively.  
• Residents can issue abroad negotiable certificates of deposits and commercial papers.  
 
1993 
• Nonresidents are allowed to hold won accounts.  
• Manufacturing companies can obtain loans in foreign currencies for all imports of inputs and 
equipment; the Bank of Korea raises the amount of foreign exchange reserves earmarked for 
supporting foreign currency loans by domestic banks from $1 billion to $4 billion.  
 
1994 
• Ceilings are abolished on borrowing by resident corporations and their foreign branches from 
nonresident financial institutions located abroad.  
• Foreign-financed general manufacturing companies are eligible for short-term overseas 
borrowing, while the overseas borrowing by foreign-financed, high-tech firms is raised to 100 
percent of the foreign capital share. 
 
1995 
• Eight leasing companies are allowed to undertake medium- and long-term borrowing offshore 
without intermediation from foreign exchange banks.  
• Direct foreign borrowing by enterprises engaged in social projects and foreign-financed, high-tech 
firms is allowed up to 100 percent of capita (90 percent for large corporations) for redemption of 
import-related debts.  
• Ratio of foreign currency loans taken by large companies for import of inputs and machinery is 
lowered to 70 percent of total cost. 
 
1996 
• Restrictions on foreign borrowing are eliminated for certain small and medium-sized firms. 
• Nonresidents are allowed to open won accounts in overseas branches of domestic banks.  
 
1997 
• In July MOFE abolished regulations on the usage of long-term loans with maturities of over five 
years brought into the country by foreign manufacturers. 
• In April the period for small and medium enterprises to import on a deferred payments basis was 
lengthened by 30 days for raw materials used in manufacturing exports commodities. The period 
was extended for large enterprises as well in August.  
• Foreign investment funds approved by the MOFE can purchase domestic money market 
instruments. Other foreign institutions and individuals require the prior approval of the MOFE. 
The issuance abroad of other securities, like certificates of deposit in foreign currency 
denominations, require the MOFE’s approval. 
• Certain forms of trade credits are allowed without prior approval. However, deferred payments 
for the imports of goods and export advances (except those by small and medium-sized firms) are 
subject to binding value limits. Export down payments up to 8 percent of the value are allowed 
for ships and plant building during production. 
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 • Foreign exchange banks can borrow from abroad. They need to report foreign borrowing to the 
MOFE when the maturity exceeds one year and for amounts over $10 million.  
• Credits from nonresidents to nonbank residents require prior approval by the MOFE.  
• Foreign-financed, high-tech companies can borrow up to 100 percent of the foreign-invested 
capital with maturity limited to three years.  
• Foreign borrowing with a maturity of less than three years is governed by the Foreign Exchange 
Act.  
• Residents cannot lend abroad without the approval of the MOFE. 
 
1998 
• On February 16 authorities removed restrictions on corporate borrowing from abroad, up to $2 
million for venture companies.  
• Authorities opened up money market instruments issued by nonfinancial institutions (commercial 
papers, commercial bills, and trade bills) to foreigners without limits. 
• The requirement that foreign borrowing from abroad exceed $1 million is eliminated. 
 
1999 
• The Foreign Exchange Management Act is abolished and replaced by the Foreign Exchange 
Transaction Act, which liberalizes most current account transactions. It also authorizes safeguard 
mechanisms, including freezing of transactions; a permission-based transaction system; the 
funneling of foreign currency to the BOK; activation of a variable deposit requirement (VDR) 
system; and requirement that a certain percentage of capital flows be deposited in a non-interest-
bearing account.  
• Overseas short-term borrowing by “financially sound” domestic firms is permitted.  
• Nonresidents are permitted to make deposits and open won-denominated savings and trust 
accounts with maturities in excess of one year. 
• Requirement that foreign-invested firms receive government approval for intrafirm transactions 
exceeding $1 million is abolished. 
 
2001 
• All restrictions are lifted on foreign currency loans to residents by domestic banks. 
• Remaining ceilings on current account transactions by individuals are eliminated. 
 
 2002 
• Regulations on individuals’ external payments are eased. 
 
 
Present Situation: 
 
• Requirements for the repatriation of overseas claims, limits on nonresident won funding aimed at 
hedge funds, and restrictions on short-term external borrowing by “financially unsound” 
corporations are still in place. 
•  The permission system for some capital account transactions is to be liberalized by December 31, 
2005, as stipulated in the current Foreign Exchange Transactions Act. 
• Sale of foreign exchange by nonresidents over US$20,000 without documentation is subject to 
notification requirements. Purchase of foreign exchange by nonresidents without documentation 
of previous sale in excess of US$10,000 is subject to notification requirements. 
• Notification requirements remain on foreign currency loans for nonbank firms, in particular loans 
in excess of US$30 million. Firms whose debt ratio is greater than industry average and/or credit 
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 rating below investment grade are considered “financially unsound” and are subject to special 
notification requirements for short-term foreign currency borrowing. Exceptions exist for certain 
“general manufacturing” or “high technology” industries. 
 
 
Capital Market Organization 
 
 
1985 
• The underwriting of foreign assets by domestic securities companies is permitted. 
 
1987 
• Foreign exchange banks begin offshore banking at the initiative of the government. 
• Nine additional foreign banks are allowed to enter the trust investment business. 
 
1993 
• Overseas branches of domestic banks are allowed to supply loans to residents who trade 
commodities futures and financial futures. 
 
1997 
• Foreign exchange banks can conduct all form of transactions in the foreign currency market, 
including swaps, options, forwards, and futures but the terms of the forward transaction between 
banks and nonbank customers must be based on bona fide transactions.  
• On December 29 restrictions on commercial bank ownership are eased to encourage foreign 
investment in domestic financial institutions. The financial sector legislation passed on December 
29 abolishes the 4 percent ownership limit for commercial banks. Purchase of bank equity by 
foreign banks is now permitted without limit but requires approval at three stages: 10 percent, 25 
percent, and 31 percent. Domestic ownership above 4 percent is permitted provided that an equal 
or larger share is held by a foreign bank 
• Commercial bank open positions in foreign currencies are subject to the following limits: (1) the 
overall overbought position must be lower than 15 percent of the equity capital, and the oversold 
position must be lower than 10 percent of the equity capital or $20 million, whichever is larger; 
(2) the spot oversold positions cannot exceed 3 percent of the equity capital or $5 million, 
whichever is larger. 
 
1998 
• On March 31 authorities allow foreign banks and brokerage houses to establish subsidiaries.  
 
1999 
• Domestic institutions are permitted to engage in derivatives transactions. 
• The principle is established under the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act that any financial 
institution meeting certain requirements merely notify MOFE before engaging in foreign 
exchange–related businesses. 
 
2002 
• Securities and insurance companies are allowed entry into the interbank market. 
 
Present situation: 61 institutions are recognized as “foreign exchange banks” and are authorized to engage 
in foreign exchange transactions for third parties. A larger number of businesses are authorized to engage 
in foreign exchange transactions on their own behalf. The overall open overbought (oversold) position in 
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 foreign currencies of foreign exchange banks must be lower than 20 percent of the equity capital. A 
foreign exchange bank must maintain reserves amounting to a prescribed proportion of its foreign 
currency deposit liabilities in the form of foreign currency deposits at the BOK. The current requirements 
are 5 percent for demand deposits, 2 percent for saving deposits, and 1 percent for foreign currency 
deposits by nonresidents and other banks. The banks are also subject to foreign currency mismatch 
regulations: 80 percent of short-term (less than three month) liabilities must be covered by deposits, and 
50 percent of long-term loans must be financed by long-term borrowing.  
 
Foreign Exchange 
 
1963  
• Multiple exchange rate system is unified, with the won pegged to the dollar.  
 
1980 
• A “multibasket” peg for the won, determined by the weighted average of the SDR basket and a 
trade-weighted basket of major currencies plus an additional “policy” adjustment factor, is 
introduced 
 
1985 
• Currency swaps are permitted. 
 
1986 
• Regulations on swaps are further liberalized.  
 
1987 
• Restrictions are lifted on futures and options. The limit on the forward contract period is 
eliminated.  
• The ceiling on foreign banks’ swap operations is relaxed by 10 percent.  
 
1988 
• The limit on swaps by foreign banks is relaxed again by 10 percent.  
 
1989 
• The ceilings on swap operations by foreign banks are relaxed by another 10 percent.  
 
1990 
• Market Average Exchange Rate (MAR) System is adopted in which the won is allowed to float 
within certain bands of daily fluctuation. Band initially is set at +/– 0.4 percent. 
 
1991 
• Band is widened to +/– 0.6 percent. 
 
1992 
• The range of forward exchange contracts admissible is extended.  
• Band is widened to +/– 0.8 percent. 
 
1993 
• Regulations on forward foreign exchange transactions are relaxed; ceilings held on foreign 
exchange deposits payable in domestic currency are abrogated.  
• Band widened to +/– 1.0 percent. 
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1994 
• Band is widened to +/– 1.5 percent. 
 
1995 
• Band is widened to +/– 2.25 percent. 
 
1996 
• The yen-won spot and forward market is established.  
• Foreign currency derivative transactions are opened to nonresidents. Documentation 
requirements for forward and futures transactions are eliminated, but transactions still need to be 
based on real demand.  
• The ceiling on swaps facility provided to foreign banks is relaxed by 10 percent. 
• Swaps are allowed for portfolio investments abroad by financial and insurance companies.  
 
1997 
• All settlements with other countries can be made in any convertible currency except the won. 
Export earnings exceeding $50,000 must be repatriated within six months. 
• Residents can purchase derivatives through a foreign exchange bank, but issuance abroad requires 
MOFE’s approval. 
• On November 11 band is widened to +/– 10 percent. 
• On December 16 South Korea floats the won. 
 
 1999 
• Real demand principle for forward and derivatives transactions is abolished, permitting further 
development of these markets. Korea Futures Exchange (KOFEX) is established. 
 
2002 
•  “The Plan for the Development of the Korean Foreign Exchange Market,” which envisions full 
liberalization of foreign exchange regulations by 2011, is announced. 
 
Present Situation: The IMF classifies the exchange rate system as independently floating in an inflation-
targeting framework. Interventions are sizable and would appear to go beyond the smoothing function as 
characterized by the Fund. 
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Figure 1  South Korean real GDP growth, 1961–2003
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Figure 2  Foreign aid to South Korea, 1953–73
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Figure 3 South Korean savings and investment, 1960–2003
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Figure 4  Composition of capital inflows, 1962–2003
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Figure 5  Real interest rates
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Figure 6  Spread between long-term government bond yields*
South Korea and the United States, 1980-2002
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Figure 7  Foreign-currency percentage share of total debt, 1994–2002
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
Source:  Goldstein and Turner (2004, table 4.4).
 
Figure 8  Borrowing by domestic banks from international banks 
and net foreign-currency assets, 1994–2002
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Figure 9   Short-term external debt as a percent of foreign exchange reserves, 
1990-2002
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Figure 10 "Modified" Goldstein-Turner Aggregate Effective Currency Mismatch (AECM) estimates, 
1994–2002
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
Source: Goldstein and Turner (2004, table 4.6).
 
Figure 11  Real GDP growth forecast and expected real exchange rate change
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Figure 12   J.P. Morgan EMBI-Global Strip Spread for South Korea, 1994–2004
 
